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8 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
9 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**
10

11 DWIGHT ROY IRVIN,

12 Plaintiff,

13 v.

14 STATE OF CALIFORNIA; AND
15 DOES 1 THROUGH 99, AND ROE
16 BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 THROUGH
17 99,

18 Defendants.

Case No. 5:18-cv-01918-CJC (AFM)

**ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND**

19 On September 10, 2018, 2018, plaintiff, then a prisoner confined at Adelanto
20 Detention Center, filed a Complaint (ECF No. 1) in this *pro se* civil rights action. On
21 October 10, 2018, the Court received a telephone message from plaintiff indicating
22 that he was no longer in custody. (ECF No. 9.) On November 8, 2018, the Court
23 granted plaintiff's request to proceed *in forma pauperis*. (ECF No. 13.)

24 Because plaintiff is proceeding *in forma pauperis*, the Court has screened the
25 Complaint prior to ordering service for purposes of determining whether the action
26 is frivolous or malicious; or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
27 seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. *See* 28
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2). The Court's screening of the pleading under the foregoing

1 statute is governed by the following standards. A complaint may be dismissed as a
2 matter of law for failure to state a claim for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable
3 legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. *See Balistreri*
4 *v. Pacifica Police Dep't*, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990); *see also Rosati v.*
5 *Igbino*, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (when determining whether a
6 complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.
7 § 1915(e)(2), the court applies the same standard as applied in a motion to dismiss
8 pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)). In determining whether the pleading states a claim on
9 which relief may be granted, its allegations of material fact must be taken as true and
10 construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. *See Love v. United States*, 915 F.2d
11 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1990). However, the “tenet that a court must accept as true all
12 of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”
13 *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Nor is the Court “bound to accept as
14 true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” *Wood v. Moss*, 134 S. Ct.
15 2056, 2065 n.5 (2014) (citing *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678). Rather, a court first “discounts
16 conclusory statements, which are not entitled to the presumption of truth, before
17 determining whether a claim is plausible.” *Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel*, 726 F.3d
18 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2013). Then, “dismissal is appropriate where the plaintiff failed
19 to allege enough *facts* to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Yagman*
20 *v. Garcetti*, 852 F.3d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted,
21 emphasis added).

22 Further, since plaintiff is appearing *pro se*, the Court must construe the
23 allegations of the pleading liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.
24 *See Hebbe v. Pliler*, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010); *see also Alvarez v. Hill*, 518
25 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2008) (because plaintiff was proceeding *pro se*, “the district
26 court was required to ‘afford [him] the benefit of any doubt’ in ascertaining what
27 claims he ‘raised in his complaint’”) (alteration in original). That said, the Supreme
28 Court has made clear that the Court has “no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal

1 to *pro se* litigants.” *Pliler v. Ford*, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004). In addition, the
2 Supreme Court has held that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
3 ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
4 recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations
5 must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the
6 assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”
7 *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted,
8 alteration in original); *see also Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (To avoid dismissal for failure
9 to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
10 to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ . . . A claim has facial
11 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
12 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (internal
13 citation omitted)).

14 In addition, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (“Rule 8”) states:

15 A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a
16 short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
17 jurisdiction . . .; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim
18 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a
19 demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in
the alternative or different types of relief.

20 (Emphasis added). Further, Rule 8(d)(1) provides: “Each allegation must be simple,
21 concise, and direct.” Although the Court must construe a *pro se* plaintiff’s pleadings
22 liberally, a plaintiff nonetheless must allege a minimum factual and legal basis for
23 each claim that is sufficient to give each defendant fair notice of what plaintiff’s
24 claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. *See, e.g., Brazil v. United States*
25 *Dep’t of the Navy*, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995); *McKeever v. Block*, 932 F.2d
26 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991) (a complaint must give defendants fair notice of the claims
27 against them). If a plaintiff fails to clearly and concisely set forth factual allegations
28 sufficient to provide defendants with notice of which defendant is being sued on

1 which theory and what relief is being sought against them, the pleading fails to
2 comply with Rule 8. *See, e.g., McHenry v. Renne*, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir.
3 1996); *Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co.*, 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981). A
4 claim has “substantive plausibility” if a plaintiff alleges “simply, concisely, and
5 directly [the] events” that entitle him to damages. *Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss.*,
6 135 S. Ct. 346, 347 (2014). Failure to comply with Rule 8 constitutes an independent
7 basis for dismissal of a pleading that applies even if the claims are not found to be
8 wholly without merit. *See McHenry*, 84 F.3d at 1179; *Nevijel*, 651 F.2d at 673.

9 Following careful review of the Complaint (and associated supplements), the
10 Court finds that it fails to name any specific defendant and fails to comply with Rule 8
11 because it fails to state a short and plain statement of each claim that is sufficient to
12 give a defendant fair notice of what plaintiff’s claims are and the grounds upon which
13 they rest. In addition, the allegations in the Complaint appear insufficient to state
14 any claim upon which relief may be granted.

15 First, to the extent that the Court can discern the claims purportedly raised in
16 the Complaint, it appears plaintiff is contending that he was wrongfully stopped,
17 arrested and incarcerated, with his property also being seized. The only specific
18 defendant named by plaintiff is the State of California, but the Eleventh Amendment
19 bars plaintiff from suing the State or its agencies in federal court. The Eleventh
20 Amendment bars federal jurisdiction over suits by individuals against a State and its
21 instrumentalities, unless either the State consents to waive its sovereign immunity or
22 Congress abrogates it. *Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman*, 465 U.S. 89,
23 99-100 (1984). In addition, “the eleventh amendment bars actions against state
24 officers sued in their official capacities for past alleged misconduct involving a
25 complainant’s federally protected rights, where the nature of the relief sought is
26 retroactive, i.e., money damages.” *Bair v. Krug*, 853 F.2d 672, 675 (9th Cir. 1988).
27 To overcome this Eleventh Amendment bar, the State’s consent or Congress’ intent
28 must be “unequivocally expressed.” *Pennhurst*, 465 U.S. at 99. While California

1 has consented to be sued in its own courts pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act,
2 such consent does not constitute consent to suit in federal court. *See BV Engineering*
3 *v. Univ. of Calif., Los Angeles*, 858 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir. 1988). Finally,
4 Congress has not repealed state sovereign immunity against suits brought under 42
5 U.S.C. § 1983.

6 Second, plaintiff's Complaint violates Rule 8. It fails to name any specific
7 defendant other than the State of California – which as discussed above is immune
8 from suit in federal court. Moreover, to state a federal civil rights claim, plaintiff
9 must allege that a “person,” while acting under color of state law, deprived him of a
10 right guaranteed under the Constitution or a federal statute. *See West v. Atkins*, 487
11 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The term “person” includes state and local officials sued in their
12 individual capacities and local governments. *Cortez v. County of Los Angeles*, 294
13 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). However, states are not persons for purposes of 28
14 U.S.C. § 1983, and section 1983 claims against states are therefore legally frivolous.
15 *See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona*, 520 U.S. 43, 69 (1997); *Jackson v.*
16 *Arizona*, 885 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1989).

17 To state a federal civil rights claim against a particular defendant, plaintiff
18 must allege that a specific defendant, while acting under color of state law, deprived
19 him of a right guaranteed under the Constitution or a federal statute. *See West*, 487
20 U.S. at 48. “A person deprives another ‘of a constitutional right, within the meaning
21 of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative
22 acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that *causes* the
23 deprivation of which [the plaintiffs complains].” *Leer v. Murphy*, 844 F.2d 628, 633
24 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting *Johnson v. Duffy*, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)
25 (emphasis and alteration in original)). Further, “[g]overnment officials may not be
26 held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of
27 respondeat superior.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 676. Accordingly, plaintiff must allege that
28 each specific defendant “through the official’s own individual actions, has violated

1 the Constitution.” *Id.* at 676-77 (“each Government official, his or her title
2 notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct”).

3 The Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s right to be secure against
4 unreasonable “seizures.” A “person is seized” whenever officials “restrain[] his
5 freedom of movement” such that he or she is “not free to leave.” *Brendlin v.*
6 *California*, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007). The Fourth Amendment applies even if no
7 formal “arrest” has occurred, if the suspect reasonably believes that he or she is not
8 free to leave. *Robinson v. Solano County*, 278 F.3d 1007, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2002)
9 (en banc). The “general rule” is that Fourth Amendment seizures are “reasonable”
10 only when based on probable cause to believe that the individual has committed a
11 crime. *See, e.g., Bailey*, 568 U.S. at 192. As the Ninth Circuit has explained,
12 “[t]raditionally, all Fourth Amendment ‘seizures’ constituted ‘arrests’ and therefore
13 required probable cause.” *United States v. Guzman-Padilla*, 573 F.3d 865, 876 (9th
14 Cir. 2009). The inquiry evaluates the circumstances from the perspective of the
15 person who has been seized, but it is an objective test of reasonableness. *See United*
16 *States v. Edwards*, 761 F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 2014); *Guzman-Padilla*, 573 F.3d at
17 884.

18 Here, it is not clear to the Court whether plaintiff is purporting to raise any
19 claims against the Doe and Roe defendants. Although listed in the Complaint’s
20 caption, no particular acts or omissions are alleged to have been committed by any
21 of the Doe or Roe defendants, and no type of descriptive allegations are provided as
22 these defendants. The Complaint spans 29 pages, but many of its allegations are
23 unintelligible or confusing. While the core incident at issue appears to be an arrest,
24 search, incarceration, and seizure of property, plaintiff does not link his factual
25 allegations to specific claims against any Doe individual or Roe entity. In addition,
26 while the Complaint alleges that plaintiff was arrested, searched, and incarcerated
27 “without cause” (ECF No. 1 at 6), the Complaint provides no factual allegations to
28 support those conclusions. Plaintiff must allege “simply, concisely, and directly

1 events” that are sufficient to inform the defendants of the “factual basis” of each
2 claim. *Johnson*, 135 S. Ct. at 347. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “a
3 plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires
4 more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
5 cause of action will not do. . . . *Bell Atlantic Corp.*, 550 U.S. at 555. For example,
6 factual allegations are needed to support the conclusions that the search and arrest
7 were unreasonable and conducted without probable cause. The Complaint fails to do
8 this. Therefore, plaintiff’s pleading does not allege sufficient facts to state a plausible
9 claim or to give a defendant fair notice of plaintiff’s claims and the grounds upon
10 which they rest.

11 Third, to the extent that plaintiff is seeking to overturn a criminal conviction
12 or criminal sentence via this action, a petition for habeas corpus is a prisoner’s sole
13 judicial remedy when attacking “the validity of the fact or length of . . . confinement.”
14 *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973); *Young v. Kenny*, 907 F.2d 874,
15 875 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff may not use a civil rights action such as this to challenge
16 the validity or duration of his conviction or incarceration. That relief is available
17 only in a habeas corpus action. In addition, to the extent that plaintiff is seeking
18 damages for an allegedly unlawful conviction, his claims are not cognizable in a civil
19 rights action unless and until plaintiff can show that “the conviction or sentence has
20 been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
21 state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a
22 federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S.
23 477, 486-87 (1994).

24 Finally, plaintiff is admonished that he must comply with the Local Rules
25 regarding the format of a pleading, such as L.R. 11-3.2, which requires that the lines
26 on each page be numbered and that no more than 28 lines of double-spaced text be
27 on each page. Irrespective of his *pro se* status, plaintiff must comply with the Federal
28 Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of the United States District Court for

1 the Central District of California. *See, e.g., Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino*, 116
2 F.3d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1997) (“*pro se* litigants are not excused from following court
3 rules”). Similarly, plaintiff must sign and date his pleading, if he decides to file a
4 First Amended Complaint. (*See* L.R. 11-1.) Finally, plaintiff must comply with Fed.
5 R. Civ. P. 10, which requires that the caption of a pleading include all defendants
6 listed in the body of the pleading. Here, the caption of the Complaint does not list
7 any specific defendants by name.

8 For these reasons, the Court finds that plaintiff’s Complaint names a defendant
9 that is immune from suit in federal court, violates Rule 8, and fails to state a claim
10 against any defendant upon which relief may be granted because it fails to set forth a
11 simple, concise, and direct statement of the factual basis of each of plaintiff’s claims
12 against each defendant. Accordingly, the Complaint is dismissed with leave to
13 amend. *See Rosati*, 791 F.3d at 1039 (“A district court should not dismiss a *pro se*
14 complaint without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of
15 the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) (internal quotation marks
16 omitted). If plaintiff wishes to pursue a federal civil rights claim against any
17 defendant, then plaintiff should set forth a short and plain statement of each such
18 claim showing that each defendant took a specific action, participated in another’s
19 action, or omitted to perform an action that caused each alleged constitutional
20 deprivation.

21 *****

22 **If plaintiff desires to pursue this action, he is ORDERED to file a First**
23 **Amended Complaint no later than March 5, 2019, remedying the deficiencies**
24 **discussed below.** Further, plaintiff is admonished that, if he fails to timely file a First
25 Amended Complaint, or fails to remedy the deficiencies of this pleading as discussed
26 herein, the Court will recommend that this action be dismissed without leave to
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1 amend and with prejudice.¹ **Plaintiff is further admonished that, if he fails to**
2 **timely file a First Amended Complaint, or if he fails to remedy the deficiencies**
3 **of this pleading as discussed herein, the Court will recommend that the action**
4 **be dismissed with prejudice on the grounds set forth above and for failure to**
5 **diligently prosecute.**

6 The clerk is directed to send plaintiff a blank Central District civil rights
7 complaint form, which plaintiff is encouraged to utilize. Plaintiff is admonished that
8 he must sign and date the civil rights complaint form, and he must use the space
9 provided in the form to set forth all of the claims that he wishes to assert in a First
10 Amended Complaint.

11 In addition, if plaintiff no longer wishes to pursue this action, he may request
12 a voluntary dismissal of the action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a).
13 The clerk also is directed to attach a Notice of Dismissal form for plaintiff's
14 convenience.

15 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

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17 DATED: 2/1/2019



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19 ALEXANDER F. MacKINNON
20 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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23 ¹ Plaintiff is advised that this Court's determination herein that the allegations in the Complaint
24 are insufficient to state a particular claim should not be seen as dispositive of that claim.
25 Accordingly, although this Court believes that you have failed to plead sufficient factual matter in
26 your pleading, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, you are not
27 required to omit any claim or defendant in order to pursue this action. However, if you decide to
28 pursue a claim in a First Amended Complaint that this Court has found to be insufficient, then this
Court, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636, ultimately may submit to the assigned district
judge a recommendation that such claim be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim,
subject to your right at that time to file Objections with the district judge as provided in the Local
Rules Governing Duties of Magistrate Judges.

1 Attachments: Civil Rights Complaint (Form CV-066)
2 Notice of Dismissal Form (CV-009)
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